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Abstract
Crises challenge client XVA management when continuous collater-
alization is not possible because a derivative locks in the client credit
level and the provider’s funding level, on the trade date, for the life of
the trade. We price XVA reduction strategies from the client point of
view comparing multiple trade strategies using Mandatory Breaks or Re-
structuring, to modifications of a single trade using a Reset. We analyze
previous crises and recovery of CDS to inform our numerical examples.
In our numerical examples Resets can be twice as effective as Mandatory
Break/Restructuring if there is no credit recovery. When recovery is at
least 1/3 of the credit shock then Mandatory Break/Restructuring can be
more effective.
1 Introduction
Crises challenge client XVA management when continuous collateralization is
not possible because a derivative locks in the client credit level and the provider’s
funding level, on the trade date, for the life of the trade. We price XVA reduction
strategies from the client point of view comparing multiple trade strategies using
Mandatory Breaks, Restructuring, to modifications of a single trade using a
Reset. Multiple trade strategies are inefficient when there is no credit change
because later trades have XVA priced in without including the probability of
client survival, because only surviving clients will enter into continuation trades.
Pricing from the client point of view is necessary because continuation trades
in multiple trade strategies are invisible to the provider by definition. This
∗Contact: chris.kenyon@mufgsecurities.com. This paper is a personal view and does not
represent the views of MUFG Securities EMEA plc (MUSE). This paper is not advice. Cer-
tain information contained in this presentation has been obtained or derived from third party
sources and such information is believed to be correct and reliable but has not been inde-
pendently verified. Furthermore the information may not be current due to, among other
things, changes in the financial markets or economic environment. No obligation is accepted
to update any such information contained in this presentation. MUSE shall not be liable in
any manner whatsoever for any consequences or loss (including but not limited to any direct,
indirect or consequential loss, loss of profits and damages) arising from any reliance on or
usage of this presentation and accepts no legal responsibility to any party who directly or
indirectly receives this material.
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means that pricing must use risk-neutral measures, and real-world-conditional
risk neutral measures. We analyze previous crises and recovery to inform our
numerical examples on CDS shock sizes, and how long it takes a firm’s CDS to
recover by how much.
We price from the client perspective so P measures are important. All P
measures are subjective as they depend on user-chosen criteria, e.g. the cali-
bration, or back-testing setup. Our approach is to provide a mix of P-measure
information, and scenarios to allow clients to assess risks of alternatives, not to
collapse this information within an expectation. This is because clients do not
hedge own-credit and provider-funding, so we do not want to pre-judge which
scenario is most important to clients. This also avoids the anchoring effect of
giving a single number since clients are not hedgers, unlike banks..
For credit shocks and recovery we analyze a comprehensive CDS database
(2002 – 20020) and give the historical P measure of shock recovery against time
from shock for different shock sizes, see Table 1. This analysis defines the range
of credit recovery and timing we use in results Tables 2 and 3. A vaccine for
SARS-CoV-2 may be months (Krammer 2020) away, and recovery from previ-
ous economic shocks generally took six months to 2–3 years. In the numerical
examples we consider CVA on an interest rate swap (IRS). The P-conditional Q
measure is less important than might be expected because continuation trades
are done at-the-money (ATM) so changes in rates levels are largely factored out.
We address changes in rates volatility by scenario analysis in Table 4.
Pricing of derivatives from the client point of view seems to be absent in the
literature, probably because clients are assumed to be price takers. However,
as we demonstrate, clients can chose which prices (instruments) they take and
when, to achieve their objectives. This moves their price taking decisions into
the realm of multi-stage stochastic optimization (Birge and Louveaux 2011) for
portfolios. However, we are interested in a simpler setup. Design of hedging
strategies for clients is a typical service provided by banks and informed by
joint assessment of scenarios and risks. Derivative pricing taking into account
non-financial institution actions is typical to capture prepayment in Mortgage
Backed Securities (Sirignano, Sadhwani, and Giesecke 2016). Similar consider-
ations apply for pricing revolving credit facilities, but the published literature
is almost non-existent.
The contributions of this paper are firstly to price XVA from the client point
of view which enables comparison of multiple trade and single trade XVA reduc-
tion strategies. We provide a precise characterization of the required probability
spaces, and conditional probability spaces. Secondly, we compare: restructur-
ing; Mandatory Breaks; and Resets. Thirdly we provide a quantification of CDS
shocks and recoveries from history to inform choices of strategies and timing.
Finally we give numerical examples to quantify trade-offs of different strategies.
XVA reduction strategies must be priced from the client point of view and this
is almost unique in the XVA literature.
2 Client pricing
We first give definitions and contract examples using Mandatory Break/Restructuring
and Reset, then the probability framework. We price from a client shareholder
value point of view, not from a firm value point of view. That is, we assume
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the client has no interest in events after their own default.
2.1 Mandatory Break/Restructuring and Reset definitions
and examples
Definition 2.1. Mandatory Break
• A Mandatory Break is a legal agreement to end a derivative on the date
specified, at the current market price, and is part of the termsheet.
• The market price is defined as the price of the derivative ignoring default
risk and funding costs.
Reset has the same effect as a Mandatory Break post-trade providing XVA
rebates are available. In Mandatory Break and Reset the original contract stops
and a new contract is entered for the remaining life of the original trade. Since
the new contract is only required by a surviving client the default probability
resets as shown in Figure 1 MIDDLE, RIGHT. The other key difference with a
Reset is that the credit and funding levels are also reset to whatever the current
levels are at the time of the start of the new contract. The profiles for Reset
and Mandatory Break after 3 years are slightly different because the Reset is
in the Q-measure and the Mandatory Break continuation exposure is in the P-
conditional-Q-measure where we have picked the same-as-now future P measure.
Section 2.3 provides a rigorous setup.
Definition 2.2. Reset
• A Reset is a legal agreement to change some aspect of the trade on the
date specified such that the NPV becomes zero, and payment of the NPV
difference at the current market price, and is part of the termsheet.
• The market price is defined as the price of the derivative ignoring default
risk and funding costs.
A multiple trade strategy occurs with Mandatory Break, because there
is a second trade after the Mandatory Break. This second trade we call the
continuation trade. This is also true for restructuring.
Figure 1 shows the exposure and default probability profiles of the vanilla
trade (TOP), then the effects of a Mandatory Break/Restructuring (MIDDLE)
and Reset (BOTTOM).
2.2 CVA and FVA
Client valuation of trades with Resets is the same as that of the provider, there
are no uncertainties in the price of CVA and FVA.
Client valuation of trades with Mandatory Break/Restructuring includes the
continuation trade after the Mandatory Break. The continuation trade could
be with a different provider to the original trade, and must be estimated by the
client. The market will also have moved by the Mandatory Break date so the
client also needs to estimate this effect. With a crisis the client aims to put the
Mandatory Break after the crisis so as not to lock in the crisis-level credit and
funding risks for any longer than necessary.
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Figure 1: TOP/LEFT: EPE, EV, and ENE profiles for 10y ATM EUR IRS with unit notional as of 2020-05-29.
TOP/RIGHT: default probability curve. The curve gives the probability of default for the next 6m. MID/LEFT:
EPE, EV, and ENE profiles for same trade with a Mandatory Break after 3y and the profiles for the new 7y
ATM IRS continuation trade assumed by the client that the bank uses from 3y to 10y. MID/RIGHT: default
probability curve used by the bank from t0 to 3y, and the default probability curve assumed by the client that
the bank uses from 3y to 10y. BOTTOM/LEFT: EPE, EV, and ENE profiles for same trade with a Reset after
3y. BOTTOM/RIGHT: default probability curve used by the bank from t0 to trade maturity.
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When clients use Restructuring, they wait and observe the market before
acting. Choosing to potentially restructure later needs to be included in the
original assessment of XVA to compare strategies. We assume equivalence with
Mandatory Break here for simplicity, i.e. there is 100% rebate available on
demand for XVA.
Thus clients view XVA from a future conditional measure perspective for
Mandatory Break/Restructuring, because they do not hedge their own default
and they do not hedge their derivative provider’s funding cost and they assume
their own survival. This requires the following probability development.
2.3 Probability spaces and conditional probability spaces
To handle client valuation in the P measure conditional on their survival we
introduce the probability space
X = (Ω,F ,P)
on a set of events Ω with a filtration F(t) and corresponding probability mea-
sures P(t). The equivalent probability space with a risk-neutral measure is
Y = (Ω,F ,Q)
P(t) are the physical measures from the point of view of t0. Given a Mandatory
Break date tm and a set of events (path) up to tm, ω ∈ F(tm), we define sets
of conditional probability spaces from X as
Xω ={(Ωω,Fω,Pω) | ω ∈ F(tm)} (1)
Xω,C ={(Ωω,C ,Fω,C ,Pω,C) | ω ∈ F(tm) and τC > tm} (2)
τC is the default time of the counterparty.
Ωω are all possible events, conditional on the set of events ω up to tm.
Fω is the filtration F conditional on the set of events ω up to tm.
Pω(t) are the probability measures P(t) for t ≥ tm, conditional on the set of
events ω up to tm.
Hence Xω is the set of all future probability spaces at tm, indexed by the
state of the world ω up to tm, and Xω,C is the set of all future probability spaces
where the client survived up to and including tm. This modifies (Ωω,Fω,Pω)
to (Ωω,C ,Fω,C ,Pω,C) by adding the additional conditioning.
Figure 2 illustrates the probability spaces X and Xω=ωa for a specific ωa.
The vertical State axis indicates the multi-dimensional state of the world. Lines
indicate which states are reachable from each other. We have chosen a recom-
bining tree because it makes it easier to display F and Fωa . In the context
of the Figure, Xω,C consists of those conditional probability spaces where the
client does not default on the possible paths ω up to tm. So, for example, it
may be that only some of the points at tm exist in ∪ω{Ωω,C} considering all ω
in F up to tm.
Now for the probability spaces in Xω, or Xω,C , we can create sets of equiv-
alent risk-neutral probability spaces Yω, or Yω,C , i.e.
Yω ={(Ωω,Fω,Qω) | ω ∈ F(tm)} (3)
Yω,C ={(Ωω,C ,Fω,C ,Qω,C) | ω ∈ F(tm) and τC > tm} (4)
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Figure 2: Illustration of unconditional (LEFT), and conditional (RIGHT) prob-
ability spaces. LEFT: X = (Ω,F ,P), where Ω = dots, F=lines. RIGHT,
Xωa = (Ωωa ,Fωa ,Pωa) for a specific ωa in F up to tm where ωa=red path;
Ωωa=green dots because only these are reachable from ωa; Fωa=green lines, as
these are the only futures reachable from ωa. In Xωa,C , Ωωa,C will be the empty
set if the client C defaulted along the path ωa, otherwise Ωωa,C = Ωωa .
These Yω and Yω,C are equivalent to Xω and Xω,C because they see the same
events, same filtrations, but have different measures, and agree on sets of mea-
sure zero (Shreve 2004) Definition 1.6.3. For example Qω,C are found by cali-
brating to the future Pω,C measure observables at tm for each ω ∈ F(tm) and τC >
tm.
2.3.1 Pricing at t0
Here we give the normal pricing, i.e. without Mandatory Break or Reset. This
covers pricing with Reset as this contract is priced in its entirety at t0.
Derivative providers price XVA as the risk-neutral expected loss of a deriva-
tive, or portfolio, from counterparty default and the funding cost whilst the
trade is alive. We assume independence of exposure and default for simplicity.
Following (Burgard and Kjaer 2014), the XVA at inception is:
CVA(t0; t0, T ) =LGD
∫ u=T
u=t0
λ(u)e
∫ s=u
s=t0
−λ(s)dsEQ
[
DrF (u)Π
+(u)
]
du (5)
FVA(t0; t0, T ) =
∫ u=T
u=t0
sF (t)e
∫ s=u
s=t0
−λ(u)dsEQ [DrF (u)Π(u)] du (6)
CVA(t0; t0, T ) means that the CVA is calculated at t0 for exposure from t0 to
T and similarly for FVA. We make the definition
XVAQ(t0; t0, T ) := CVA(t0; t0, T ) + FVA(t0; t0, T ) (7)
where we include the measure that the XVA used for clarity. Also:
λ(t) = counterparty hazard rate.
Π+ = positive exposure of position w.r.t. counterparty.
rF (t) := sF (t) + r(t) = Bank funding cost, and separation into funding
spread and riskless rate.
Since trades end on their Mandatory Break dates, XVA is calculated up to
the Mandatory Break date of the derivatives with Mandatory Breaks, and to
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the full term with Resets, where T is the date of the last payment. To continue
the trade after a Mandatory Break the client must enter a new trade and pay
XVA on this continuation trade.
2.3.2 Pricing with Mandatory Breaks at t > t0
To price Mandatory Breaks from the client point of view we need to price the
trade and XVA after the Mandatory Break/Restructuring as well as the trade
and XVA before the Mandatory Break/Restructuring.
Clients do not hedge their own default probability nor the funding cost of
the provider so they value XVA in the real world, i.e. the P-measure. Clients
will only enter into a trade after a Mandatory Break if they survive so we need
to consider this.
A key factor in Mandatory Break valuation is the setup of the continuation
trade after the Mandatory Break. Typically this will be at the money (ATM),
not at the previous level. The settlement at the Mandatory Break date provides
the hedge against changes in riskless value from changes in market level. This
is the functional hedge aspect of the trade in action.
Assuming a single trade, without a Mandatory Break the XVA, here CVA
and FVA, cost to a client is just Equation 7:
XVAClient(t0; t0, T ) = XVA
Q(t0; t0, T ) (8)
The Reset case is covered by the above when the exposures within Equations 5
and 6 are from the resetting trade.
With a Mandatory Break at tm the client cost is the sum of the XVA on the
trade with the mandatory break, and the later continuation trade to original
trade maturity
XVAMBClient(t0, ω; t0, T ) = XVA
Q(t0; t0, tm) + XVA
Qω,C (tm; tm, T ) (9)
XVAMBClient(t0, tm; t0, T ) is a random variable because it depends on the future
state of the world via the events up to tm, i.e. ω, and the client survival up
to tm within Qω,C . As we saw above, Qω,C is a future risk-neutral measure
dependent on earlier P measures.
The client cannot hedge XVAQω,C (tm; tm, T ) at t0 with the street at a price
the client will accept because the client considers that the observed CDS curve
does not reflect the client’s recovery post-crisis. Also, counterparties may be
reluctant to trade CDS referring to the client with the client. In short, the
client’s view is that supply and demand for their CDS does not reflect future
credit risk levels, but includes additional premia. Another way of saying this is
that the client does not calibrate the drift of their P measures to the current
observed CDS curve.
Below we look at examples of how the Mandatory Break changes the total
XVA cost to the client, MB(tm, ω), as a function of the Mandatory Break date
tm and the assumptions on recovery, i.e. Pω,C
MB(tm, ω) := XVAClient(t0; t0, T )−XVAMBClient(t0, ω; t0, T ) (10)
= XVAQ(t0; t0, T )−
(
XVAQ(t0; t0, tm) + XVA
Qω,C (tm; tm, T )
)
(11)
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We characterize classes of ω by the change in credit spread of the client at tm
relative to t0.
We now look at historical CDS shocks and recovery to inform the numerical
examples.
3 Crises and recovery
Here we analyze CDS shocks and their recovery. The CDS universe used is pre-
selected for a minimal level of liquidity, starts in May 2002 and ends May 2020.
The main indicator we use is the maximum of the 1Y and 5Y CDS spreads to
allow for CDS curve and liquidity changes under stress.
We want to detect shocks that are significant to firms and recoveries that
are usable for hedging purposes, so data is prepared as follows to reduce effects
of noise, insufficient data, and missing data.
• Only consider names from three regions, Asia, Europe, and North Amer-
ica, because these have the largest number of active names (>500 each).
• Remove any name that has less than 2.1 years’ data. 2.1 as a cutoff is
derived from the window of 1 year for detecting shocks and the 1 year
no-detect period after a shock detection. Gaps are permitted and linearly
interpolated. We use a window size of one year so if there is less than two
year’s data the name will not provide a useful contribution.
• Apply a 21-point median filter. This takes the median across a month so
that the results are not affected by daily noise.
Data preparation reduces the initial dataset from 10.1m observations to 6.6m
and the total number of names from 5.4k to 3.4k. Very roughly half of the names
are active on any given date. Obviously the results may be biased towards liquid
names so this caveat should be included in making any use of the results in this
paper.
We define a shock in historical CDS as:
• A shock for an individual company is an increase of CDS spread over a
past window of at least a given size, where this shock occurs at least one
window period after any previous shock.
– The window period chosen is one year.
– We look at shocks sized 250bps, 500bps, and 1000bps. Shock size is
measured as
shock size := CDS(t)− quantile(10%, {CDS(u) : t− 1 ≤ u < t})
(12)
• A crisis for the market is when the percentage of CDS names undergoing
shocks is at least a given percentage of active CDS names.
• Recovery is the change in CDS spread at fixed horizons after a shock for
an individual company.
– Change in CDS spread at 6m, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y, and 5y horizons after
each shock.
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Figure 3: Percent of active names with shocks over the last year. Different
colors correspond to different shock sizes: 250bps = green, 500bps = black, and
1000bps = red. Crisis periods are shown by lowered levels of the blue curve.
Small variations of this definition have no effect on results.
– CDS spread change at each horizon is defined as the change to the
median CDS level at ±5% of the horizon. This is to model clients
having some flexibility on exactly when to transact any re-hedge, i.e.
considering horizon h with a shock date of t:
CDS spread change :=quantile(50%, {CDS(u) : t+ 0.95× h ≤ u < t+ 1.05× h})
− CDS(t) (13)
The blue line in Figure 3 shows the definition of market crises used: 6% of
active names with at least a 250bps shock in the last one year. This definition
was chosen to highlight the periods with elevated percentages of CDS with
shocks. Small variations of this definition have little effect on results.
4 Numerical results
We first describe historical recovery from shocks and then give effects of alter-
native XVA management strategies.
4.1 Recovery from shocks
Table 1 gives the quantiles of distribution of changes in CDS spreads as defined
in Equation 13 for horizons of {0.5y, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y, 5y} in crisis periods. We
can observe that
• Looking at the median rows (0.50s) by two years most of the initial shock
is recovered. For the largest shock, 1000bps, 80% of the recovery is after
one year.
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shock 0.5y 1.0y 2.0y 3.0y 4.0y 5.0y n
250.0 horizon (years) at 2y
0.05 -920 -1230 -1490 -1345 -1500 -1617 1686
0.25 -171 -251 -316 -331 -337 -347 1686
0.50 -28 -160 -205 -176 -212 -233 1686
0.75 171 62 -91 -81 -93 -152 1686
0.95 1331 1728 417 380 437 175 1686
shock 0.5y 1.0y 2.0y 3.0y 4.0y 5.0y n
500.0 horizon (years) at 2y
0.05 -1370 -2293 -2433 -2277 -2462 -2769 898
0.25 -342 -515 -613 -637 -691 -710 898
0.50 -64 -350 -453 -438 -493 -534 898
0.75 352 -9 -262 -266 -307 -416 898
0.95 3140 2951 741 475 487 132 898
shock 0.5y 1.0y 2.0y 3.0y 4.0y 5.0y n
1000.0 horizon (years) at 2y
0.05 -1546 -2750 -3361 -2943 -3317 -3026 469
0.25 -715 -1042 -1241 -1199 -1280 -1378 469
0.50 -237 -812 -953 -915 -999 -1096 469
0.75 773 -89 -714 -658 -797 -936 469
0.95 6557 5194 822 334 792 -221 469
Table 1: Quantiles of distribution of changes in CDS spreads from shocks for
horizons of {0.5y, 1y, 2y, 3y, 4y, 5y} in crisis periods. All shocks and changes
are in bps. The number of shocks in the last column (n) for the 2y horizon. The
first column gives the quantile of the distribution of the change in CDS spread.
We display {5%, 25%, 50%, 75%, 95%} quantiles.
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• At least 5% of the time there is no recovery. Things get worse.
• 25% of the time there is mild recovery until five years when most of the
shock is recovered. For the largest shock, even in the 25th percentile 70%
of the recovery is present by two years.
There appears to be survivor bias in this analysis since we only observe
CDSs that do not default. However, from a Mandatory Break point of view
this is correct because in the case of default the client is not concerned about
trade renewal. That is, we only want to consider cases where the client survives.
There is no bias from the Mandatory Break use and design perspective.
We now have a quantification of both recovery and risk or degree of recovery
from historical CDS shocks. Now we need to add the CVA quantification w.r.t.
Mandatory Break and to bring the two parts together.
4.2 Effects of XVA management strategies
We now look at XVA management strategies informing the range of our analysis
by the timescale of shock recovery, i.e. 1-5 years, in the previous section and
the sizes of the observed shocks and recoveries, i.e. 250 to 1000bps.
We consider an example 10 year EUR IRS as of 2020-05-29, where the client
receives the floating rate. This is typical in that it provides the client with
protection from increases in interest rates, and EUR is currently at historically
low levels, although rates can go down as well as up beyond previous levels.
When pricing forward XVA we assume that the current interest curve and
volatility is the same at the Mandatory Break point. This assumption is often
called same-as-now as opposed to risk-neutral where, for example, we would
move up the yield curve. We also consider changes in volatility at the Mandatory
Break point below. We compare with using a Reset which is priced at t0 so
cannot benefit from later changes of client credit risk but as mentioned above
has the advantage of using conditional survival probability for the part of the
trade after the reset (and all times in fact).
4.2.1 Reset
Table 2 shows the XVA reduction as a percentage of XVA charge without a
Reset for Reset points at 1y to 5y and CDS shocks of 500bps and 1000bps.
Note that the CDS level is locked in for the whole life of the trade. In this
example the change in exposure from the different reset dates roughly balances
the different default probabilities. There is a 20% to 25% reduction in XVA for
Reset points at 1 to 5 years. This reduction has little dependence on the CDS
level.
Since the trade has a Reset there is no dependence on the P measure, or
later realized CDS levels or realized interest rate volatility levels.
4.2.2 Mandatory Break and Restructuring
We assume that the continuation trade is ATM. Table 3 shows the reduction in
XVA compared to a trade without a Mandatory Break, or post-trade restruc-
turing. We assume that the restructuring rebate pays 100% of the XVA and
is available. The continuation trade is at the future CDS level of the client, so
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CDS level 1 2 3 4 5
IRS maturity dVol shock reached reset point (years)
10 0.0 500.0 600.0 19.9 24.9 24.2 20.7 16.0
1000.0 1100.0 21.8 24.8 22.1 17.5 12.5
Table 2: XVA reduction as a percentage of XVA charge without a Reset for
Reset points at 1y to 5y and CDS shocks of 500bps and 1000bps. Note that the
CDS level is locked in for the whole life of the trade. dVol of zero means that
there is no change to the interest rate volatility.
CDS level 1 2 3 4 5
maturity dVol shock reached CDS change mandatory break point (years)
10 0.0 500.0 600.0 -250.0 -4.4 2.0 4.9 5.9 5.7
0.0 12.6 15.9 15.7 13.8 11.1
125.0 23.5 24.5 22.2 18.5 14.2
250.0 36.4 34.5 29.7 23.8 17.6
500.0 69.4 59.4 47.7 36.0 25.4
1000.0 1100.0 -500.0 -2.9 -3.1 -4.0 -4.2 -3.7
0.0 7.6 6.5 4.2 2.5 1.4
250.0 16.7 14.2 10.4 7.2 4.8
500.0 29.4 24.5 18.5 13.2 8.8
1000.0 71.8 57.0 42.3 29.7 19.5
Table 3: XVA reduction as a percentage of XVA charge without a Mandatory
Break for Mandatory Break points at 1y to 5y and CDS shocks of 500bps and
1000bps. We also consider CDS change at the time of entering into the continu-
ation trade. Interest rate volatility and yield curve same-as-t0 for continuation
trade. Negative reductions indicate increases.
we include a range of possibilities, including improvement and worsening. Even
with significantly worse CDS levels there is little increase in total XVA, less
than 5%. For as-is CDS levels the Mandatory Break is roughly half as effective
as a Reset. This is because the surviving client at the Mandatory Break date
pays XVA without the benefit of the conditional survival probability: defaulting
clients simply have no need of the continuation trade.
When the CDS level improves after the initial shock the reduction in XVA
can be two to three times the reduction from a Reset. For a 500bps shock,
starting from 100bps, the break-even w.r.t. a Reset is roughly an improvement
of 1/4 of the shock. For a 1000bps shock the break-even is roughly 1/3 of
the shock. The XVA reduction pattern is almost always better with a shorter
Mandatory Break date, provided the CDS level has improved.
Table 4 shows XVA reduction as a percentage of XVA charge without a
Mandatory Break for Mandatory Break points at 2y for CDS shocks of 500bps
and 1000bps. We also consider CDS change at the time of entering into the
continuation trade. Interest rate volatility differences covered are -10bps to
+10bps, whilst the yield curve is same-as-t0 for continuation trade. We observe
that there is significant interplay between the volatility effect and the CDS
12
dVol -10.0 0.0 10.0
maturity shock reached split CDS change volatility change (bps)
10 500.0 600.0 2 -250.0 18.8 2.0 -14.8
0.0 29.3 15.9 2.4
125.0 35.9 24.5 13.1
250.0 43.5 34.5 25.6
500.0 62.4 59.4 56.5
1000.0 1100.0 2 -500.0 13.5 -3.1 -19.7
0.0 20.8 6.5 -7.8
250.0 26.7 14.2 1.6
500.0 34.6 24.5 14.5
1000.0 59.2 57.0 54.8
Table 4: XVA reduction as a percentage of XVA charge without a Mandatory
Break for Mandatory Break points at 2y for CDS shocks of 500bps and 1000bps.
We also consider CDS change at the time of entering into the continuation
trade. Interest rate volatility differences covered are -10bps to +10bps, whilst
the yield curve is same-as-t0 for continuation trade. Negative reductions indicate
increases.
change effect as we would expect as both are important in XVA. As the CDS
recovery increases there is less relative effect of change in volatility.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Here we have considered client XVA management using either Mandatory Breaks/
Restructuring or Resets as tools adapted for recovery from crises and normal
times respectively, and the cross-over between them. Restructuring are similar
in XVA effects to Mandatory Breaks but can be done on any date if the provider
agrees and if an XVA rebate is given. The issue when CDS levels are high is
that a derivative locks in the client credit risk level and the provider’s funding
level on the trade date, for the life of the trade.
Analysis of historical crises defined by CDS shocks 2002–2020 shows that
recovery is largely complete two years after the initial shock considering the
median CVA recovery. For 500bps shocks the 75% of the names recover by at
least half by two years, with 5% showing continuing deterioration.
We found that if the CDS level does not recover, or if there was no shock in
the first place, then a Reset for a 10y IRS is roughly twice as effective in reducing
XVA as a Mandatory Break. If the CDS level improves for the client by even
1/3 of the shock to the CDS level, then a Mandatory Break or restructuring is
at least as good as a Reset, and can be several times better. Analysis of CDS
shock recovery from historical crises indicates that this level of recovery occurs
in at least 75% of cases.
Pricing from the client point of view answers whether a Mandatory Break
and then a continuation contract is a true break, i.e. two separate contracts,
or just a single contract in practice. For both parties the riskless price of the
continuation trade after a Mandatory Break is different seen from the original
start date compared to the continuation from a Reset, because it is a Q-in-P
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measure price not a Q measure price. We provided a precise definition of the
relevant probability spaces and measures. Also the client faces higher XVA with
a Mandatory Break than with a single contract containing a Reset. These differ-
ences are invisible when pricing from the usual bank point of view because then
only the contract up to the Mandatory Break is priced. However the client has
to compare using a Reset in a single trade, or a Mandatory Break/Restructuring
with two sequential trades.
Hedge accounting is highly relevant and will be covered elsewhere in detail
(Kenyon and Kenyon 2020). A key aspect is that Accounting can follow the
“entitys risk management objective and strategy for undertaking the hedge” so
is not limited to contracts that exist at some particular time, e.g. at original
trade inception. This objective and strategy requires “formal documentation”
by the entity, see (IFRS 2018), Section 6.4.1.b and must meet hedge effectiveness
tests in Section B6.4.1 including effects of credit risk in Section B6.4.7.
This paper is almost unique in taking the client’s perspective in XVA val-
uation using a real-world perspective, rather than considering valuation from
the provider’s side in the risk-neutral perspective. However, consideration of
Mandatory Break makes this a requirement as the provider is indifferent (all
risk is hedged) whereas the client is exposed to changes in their own credit risk
and the providers funding risk. Since we are currently in the Covid-19 crisis as
defined by CDS shocks we have considered Mandatory Break valuation from this
point of view, i.e. within a crisis from the historical CDS analysis. During nor-
mal times, or for clients unaffected by XVA, with no significant changes in CDS
level a Reset can be twice as effective as a Mandatory Break or restructuring.
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